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Perhaps nowhere else does the controversy of performance philosophy show itself so explicitly as 
at the moment of its very first utterance: in the announcement – as contentious to some as it is 
impertinent, no doubt, to others – that performance philosophy ‘stages a new field.’  What does 
such an announcement betray if it is not the presumption of foundation: that a new discipline has 
broken surface, that an upstart knowledge has muscled its way on to the broader field of older and 
more venerable forms of enquiry; that a brash demand has been made that it receive recognition 
and a certain entitlement in respect of its claim to autonomy – in short, that it be dignified with 
that same esteem owing to every disciplinary subject (however loosely defined) insofar as it 
represents a discrete field of knowledge. But performance philosophy is answerable to two 
fundamental rebukes for its apparent impudence: first that it is no more than an imposter and 
charlatan at the court of the ‘queen of all disciplines’,1 philosophy, where it has had the temerity to 
trespass; and, second, that it is a mere usurper and interloper within the rather less secure, but 
none the less, well-established ‘conglomerate’ of disciplines (to employ Margaret Mead’s 
description of anthropology) that make up the field of theatre and performance studies (Mead 
1995, 3).  If it is – at best – a mere subset of existing philosophy, or – as appears more likely – not 
philosophy at all but an ingenious ‘rebranding’ of the existing field of performance studies under a 
different guise, then in neither case can it lay any claim to the status of a new ‘field’.   What does a 
cursory glance at those disparate tendrils, fronds and vines of research activity cultivated on this 
field disclose but the fact that performance philosophy is united neither by its object nor by its 
method, and that in lieu of either it no more announces a new programme of study any more than 
it conforms to the minimal standards of coherence that we would expect of any legitimate 
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discipline, without which no guaranteed pattern of enquiry is able to be specified, and none of its 
data verified.  If it is a field it is as if one can plant almost anything in it, as long as the weeds and 
wildflowers that grow there derive their sustenance from the basic formula that “performance 
philosophy = ‘[any] performance y’ + ‘[any] philosopher x.’” 
Confronted with the scandal of such an impertinent thought the following essay attempts to make 
some headway with redistributing the terms of this problem – not by following the tortuous path 
of defending the indefensible – but by seizing upon the radicality inherent in the proposition that 
lies at the heart of Performance Philosophy itself.  The title – “Thinking without Authority, 
performance philosophy as the democracy of thought” – is ‘borrowed’ almost verbatim from Laura 
Cull’s essay, ‘Performing Philosophy – Staging a New Field’ which is published in the collection of 
essays, Encounters in Performance Philosophy (as part of the new Palgrave series ‘Performance 
Philosophy’).  In fact, I would like to take this opportunity to consider performance philosophy in 
relation to what Cull, who is following the French philosopher François Laruelle, terms ‘the 
democracy of thought’.  This, to my mind, denotes the radical ambition of performance philosophy, 
although the scope of that ambition has perhaps not yet been fully assayed, interrogated or 
understood.  Cull herself begins on a modest note, writing at the beginning of her chapter that she 
aims to provide a context and introduction to the emerging field of performance philosophy.  But 
of course what the essay does is far more than simply provide a context by which we might 
understand how those multiple, and sometimes opposing endeavours, converge on that 
community of scholars who would happily identify themselves as ‘performance philosophers’.  If 
the essay seeks to announce the emergence of a new field, it does not do so by merely stipulating 
its existence: it also convokes that field by setting it forth in relation to that which is without doubt 
most challenging for it.  In the first instance, that challenge is to think through the possibility that 
performance is itself a kind of philosophical endeavour, that performance ‘thinks’.   
But what to be precise is so challenging in the statement ‘performance thinks’?  I think we can begin 
see the nature of the challenge when we realise that whatever challenges us also accuses us.  To 
hear the phrase ‘performance thinks’ in the accusatory voice is to confront the demand that we 
must fundamentally re-evaluate our assumptions in our approaches to thinking about 
performance; we must abandon our habitual way of doing things.  The challenge is encapsulated 
in the question: is the relationship between philosophy and performance merely a ‘one way 
street’?2  Must it always be, in Cull’s words, a matter of ‘application’ – a matter of applying a pre-
existing theory to an object (in the case of a performance); or – seen from the perspective of the 
object – as a use of performance to exemplify a particular theoretical argument.  The accusatory 
voice, if we have an ear for it, declares that we who have a concern for performance as an art form, 
we who claim to understand it best, do not – for all our laudatory pronouncements, our clever 
critiques, our incisive ‘readings’ and our superior insights – do it the justice of letting it ‘think for 
itself’.  Where do we begin if not from the presupposition that performance or theatre does not 
think? It is only because it does not think that we are compelled to then take upon ourselves the 
task of thinking for it.  But thinking for something is always to place thinking before the thing: even 
when our thinking expresses our love for it.  What, indeed, is philosophy if it is not precisely this 
gesture of solicitude and passion? – as Giorgio Agamben points out the ‘intimacy between 
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friendship and philosophy is so profound that philosophy contains the philos, the friend, in its very 
name’ (Agamben 2009, 25).  And yet, however solicitous one’s intentions may be, and however 
much one conceives the act of thinking as the extreme gesture of friendship, such acts of 
‘philosophilia’ implicitly betray an authoritarian reflex that deprives performance of its autonomy; 
that sees in ‘performance-as-illustration’ the demonstration and exercise of the sovereign power 
of truly transcendent thought – one that precisely reduces performance to the predicative object 
of thought. 
In this way we produce philosophies ‘of’ performance, but we deny performance the right to speak 
to us philosophically.  Thus does an ill-fated passion lead one to betray one’s friends!  And yet what 
draws us to theatre, and to performance, gives the lie to each of our attempts to think on behalf 
of performance/theatre, and here is the basic paradox: for what draws us to think ‘about 
performance’ is nothing less than the fact – to borrow Alain Badiou’s well-known axiom – that 
‘theatre thinks’ (Badiou 2005, 72).3  
It is in relation to this challenge, this accusation, and this axiom that performance philosophy 
claims to do something radical.  To experience this radicalism is exceptionally difficult, not because 
it is complex, but because it possesses a disarming simplicity.   It challenges us to abandon that 
‘principle of sufficient philosophy’ – as Laruelle aptly calls it – which philosophers of performance 
are so enamoured of.  To put this in rather more precise terms, it challenges us to abandon 
philosophy’s claim to transcendental authority, although it should be understood that this is by no 
means a call to abandon philosophy as such or to ‘overcome’ it.  Performance philosophy is not an 
‘anti-philosophy’ any more than it is its negation (“performance philosophy = ¬ philosophy”).  Let 
me try to explain what this means by raising an obvious objection: what is performance philosophy 
if it is not a philosophy of performance?  Cull tells us that performance philosophy designates 
‘simply, a different kind of thinking… one that challenges philosophy’s tendency to conceive itself 
as the highest form of thinking’ (Cull 2014, 29).  Already one understands a line of demarcation has 
been drawn here – and that performance philosophy is not just yet another philosophy any more 
than it is just another re-launching of performance theory.  (In fact, on the contrary, performance 
philosophy is precisely not a theory of performance at all.)  This circumvention is by no means to 
be thought trivially, then, although to see this we need first put the proposition to the test.   
It would be easy to agree that performance or theatre thinks if by that we mean one of two things.  
First, that theatre thinks in the sense that those who make it – the scenographers, directors, actors 
and so on have a share in that human activity we call ‘thinking’.  Aside from being trivial this usually 
reduces to the basic distinction of an essentially technical determination of thought as opposed to 
a philosophical one – a thought that applies itself to resolving practical problems, and is rather less 
concerned with determining, for example, the truth or falsity of a proposition which is the province 
of philosophy proper.  It is thinking but it is not ‘thought’ in any profound sense.  Second, we say 
that theatre is ‘thoughtful’ in that (at its best) a play may inspire us to think ‘about’ its content: we 
say a good performance not only moved us but that it stimulated us intellectually.  Performance 
acts as a medium bearing ideas, issues and messages of the kind that are of concern to us.  It is, 
after all, a human medium; it speaks directly to us.  And it is these ideas, issues and messages that 
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can be reported and translated into pieces of critical writing where the ‘meaning’ of the show, or 
the ‘intention’ of the theatre makers – received but barely understood by the average theatre 
audience – is finally illuminated by the perceptive critic.  But neither technical nor critical and 
hermeneutic thinking are intended here: the challenge rather is to see performance not as 
represented in another thought, but simply as thought itself – to see ‘performance as philosophy’ 
(Cull 2014, 20). 
But there is a further, more fundamental issue and problem here: if performance really is a 
different kind of thinking to philosophy, as Cull asserts, then performance philosophy itself is 
already not ‘a philosophy’, but something distinguished ‘in kind’.  So if the first two objections 
sought to distinguish the mode of thinking ascribed to performance and theatre by ‘degree’, as 
being less than philosophical, the second seems to render the very idea of performance philosophy 
nonsensical by suggesting its absolute difference from philosophy.  If its mode of thought is distinct 
in kind, then how can it share an identity with philosophy at all?  How can there be a performance 
philosophy?  Here we return to the claim that theatre is an event of thought, or that performance 
thinks – that theatre and performance philosophises, yet in a way that distinguishes it from 
philosophy’s own performance. As a result we are returned, inexorably, to an ambiguity from which 
we have not managed to escape and can hardly have claimed to have clarified. 
So, let us ask again: what is performance philosophy?  
In order to begin to address what this question is asking, I would like to change its terms for a 
moment by raising a different question – that of philosophy’s own performance.  In the first 
instance, one can see that there is nestled within the question ‘what is performance philosophy?’ 
another question that philosophy not only recognises, but takes to be its own most concern.  After 
all, does not every philosopher ask themselves (when they are ‘old enough’ as Deleuze once said) 
the following question: ‘What is philosophy?’  And when they ask this question do they not have 
precisely the question of philosophy’s own performance and performativity in view?  When Kant 
asked himself the question, for instance, it was in order to assert the conviction that philosophy’s 
dignity derived from the superior analytic power of philosophical determination over all other 
forms of knowledge: ‘According to its world concept [philosophy] is the science of the ultimate ends 
of human reason’ and for this reason it is philosophy that ‘first gives value to all other cognitions’ 
(Kant 1988, 27).  The function of philosophy is not just to govern its own thought – but all thought.   
Now Deleuze, who also asked this question when he was old enough, provided – in his own way – 
an answer that (not unlike Heidegger who had asked the same question before him) encompassed 
philosophy as a whole.  That is, he answered it in part as an urgent historical problematic that is 
not reducible to the history of ideas, in order thereby to derive its transcendental function, which 
is to say, its proper authority and its essential definition.  What is philosophy – performatively 
viewed – for Deleuze?  Philosophy is the ‘discipline that consists of creating concepts,’ (Deleuze 
1991, 473) while the philosopher is a ‘conceptual persona’ (Descartes, Kant, Badiou…) who must be 
understood precisely in relation to a specific performativity: ‘To create concepts… is to do 
something’ (Deleuze 1991, 475).  But – quite opposed to Heidegger, in fact – Deleuze raises the 
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question ‘what is philosophy’ not in order to begin preparations for the ‘destruktion’ of 
metaphysics, but to defend philosophy against its ‘insolent and calamitous rivals’ (477) – for 
example, those contemporary sophists, the marketing men who appropriate the nomenclature of 
the ‘concept’ to peddle products and flog commodities.  If they are sophists it is because they are 
dealers of pseudo concepts, and their monstrous fabrications are really falsifications and forgeries 
rather than genuine creations.  The philosopher, by contrast, assumes the ‘exclusive’ right to the 
concept in its legitimate and true sense: it is this right that gives philosophy its historic ‘function’ 
(476) – albeit not any ‘privilege’ for Deleuze – for there are, he says, ‘other ways of thinking and 
creating, other models of ideation that do not have to pass through concepts’ (476).  However, 
while the ‘sciences, arts and philosophies are all equal creators… it falls to philosophy alone to 
create concepts in the strict sense’ (474).  The philosopher has an important job to do then – to 
create and polish concepts – to furnish them so that others may make use of them (philosophers 
of performance for example).4 
So here we have a glimpse of the philosopher’s answer to the question of philosophy’s own 
performance – one that responds to the urgent call to preserve philosophy’s place, against the 
usurpers who flood the marketplace with those pseudo concepts that bear the signature, not of 
great thinkers, but of salesmen.  Two things to observe here in relation to Deleuze’s response, 
however:  First that the question ‘what is philosophy?’ arrives at no philosophical solution, since 
there is no answer that can provide philosophy with its own concept.  There is no principle of 
sufficient reason, as Heidegger once said, to ground the thinking practiced by philosophy as such.  
The question ‘what is philosophy’ is thus to be understood not as a strict philosophical question, 
but as a question about its performativity.  And yet as such it points to that which every 
performance of philosophy necessarily presupposes – that every philosophical assignment begins 
with a decision.  To answer the question ‘what is philosophy’ is not just to decide what philosophy 
itself is vis-a-vis what it does, however; it is to decide thereby on the whole of the Real: ‘To 
philosophize is to decide Reality and the thoughts that result from this’ (Laruelle [1998] 2009, 56). 
This decisional structure, writes Laruelle, constitutes the very ‘architecture’ of philosophy.  It is the 
‘invariant’ of all philosophy regardless of the specific claims made on the basis of a particular 
philosophical outlook in contrast to another (Laruelle 2013, 233).  To say it is invariant is to not to 
say that all philosophy says the same thing, but rather that all philosophy shares a structural 
identity insofar as each seeks to represent the ‘true’ Real.  Philosophy puts itself before and above 
the Real – in the act of decision – and in this way assumes, says Laruelle, ‘the position of 
transcendence’5 (Laruelle 2013, 235) with respect to the Real.  By the same token, this condemns 
philosophy to a perpetual state of polemos: what is philosophy if not an interminable positional 
struggle, between competing claims made on the Real?   As Kant famously wrote, ‘Every 
philosophical thinker builds his own work… on the ruins of another’ (Kant 1988, 29). And the 
problem that arises from the history of philosophical agonistics, once one has the invariant 
structure of philosophical decision in view, is how one decides between the different philosophies; 
how one decides between ‘undecidables’?  Or, to put the same point otherwise, philosophical 
decision, while by no means arbitrary, is always ultimately without foundation.  Lacking an ultimate 
ground in the sufficiency of its own reason, every decision must be seen to be radically contingent.6 
For philosophy’s own ‘narcissistic’ imaginary, however, it is always a necessary contingency without 
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which there would be no nomenclature of thought at all.  This is the syntactical style which 
distinguishes philosophy’s own performance – the performative ‘logic’ of concept formation – 
according to what we might identify as the fundamental disposition of the philosophical attitude 
(Laruelle 2013, 233).   
There are two senses in which we might understand philosophy through its disposition.  The first 
pertains to the structural apparatus of philosophy; the second to its temperament.  What is an 
apparatus, or a dispositif, as Michel Foucault once called it?  An apparatus ‘has as its major function 
at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need’ (Foucault 1980, 195).  When 
Heidegger asks, for example, ‘what is philosophy?’ in his eponymous lecture, what is announced 
there by way of response to the question is described not just as ‘a’ but as ‘the historical question 
of our Western-European actuality’ (Heidegger 2003, 41).  Invoking a philosophical dispositif is 
always performed (in Heidegger at least) for the sake of the salvation of man.  There are, to be 
sure, many kinds of apparatus – and Agamben is no doubt right in defining the ‘extreme phase of 
capitalist development in which we live as a massive accumulation and proliferation of 
apparatuses’ (Agamben 2009, 15). Nevertheless, I do not think it is too farfetched to say (if we 
borrow Laruelle’s notion that philosophy is a transcendental-empirico doublet) that it is the 
philosophical apparatus as such that acts and that has always acted as a kind of benchmark for all 
others: it is the dispositif of all the dispositifs – the apparatus of apparatuses.   Its dynamics of 
freedom and obligation, determination and indetermination, identity and difference, knowledge 
and power, and so on, procures a compositional mix of transcendent knowledge and a non-
discursive or ‘immanent’ content.  What the philosophical apparatus institutes is that ‘ontological 
difference’ over which philosophy ranges, in virtue of which its determinations are produced for 
the sake of governing its objects – and by means of which philosophy is able to position itself as 
the ultimate legislator of the world.  
That is to say, viewed generally, a philosophical dispositif is precisely a syntactical structuring of 
things: an ordering and arranging of things according to their conceptual or definitional 
predications. The philosophical apparatus is always an attempt at synthetic mediation, or of 
analytic separation, and a pre-disposing of the world according to the sufficiency of its 
representation.  It acts as a kind of ‘mirror’ upon whose reflective surface, the Real is alienated 
(Laruelle 2013, 135). Disponere means to arrange; and ponere – to position, to place and put things 
in their proper place.  Thus will philosophy’s temperament be defined by its taste for order and for 
conceptual mastery over the dimension of what is non-philosophical.  As Laruelle writes: ‘Each 
philosophy defines a non-philosophical margin that it tolerates, circumscribes, reappropriates, or 
which it uses in order to expropriate itself: as beyond or other to philosophical mastery’ (Laruelle 
2013, 2).  It is, above all, the philosophical apparatus, then, that acts as a kind of apportioning 
machine that ‘cuts’ the Real – ‘auto-découpage’ as Laruelle calls it – and that renders philosophy, 
through the ‘auto’ positional act of decision, as always transcendent to the object of decision.  What 
‘auto position’ bestows upon philosophy is, in other words, its epistemological or ontological 
priority over the represented object.  Philosophical decision is thus always a sovereign decision, 
and one that simultaneously asserts philosophy’s sovereignty in the order of knowledge.  This 
hierarchical logic, however, which belongs foremost to the economy of knowledge produced by 
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the apparatus of philosophy – insofar as it enacts a sovereign decision – both institutes the law and 
places philosophy, at the same time, in a permanent quandary where it is seen as both ‘judge and 
exception’ (Laruelle 2013, 45).  With respect to the Real, however, the law instituted by philosophy 
is in force, but in the final instance has no ‘power’ of determination over it. The reason for this goes 
to the heart of Laruelle’s insight into the radical autonomy and indifference of the Real to 
philosophical determination: ‘The Real does not allow that it be seized or captured as a thing by a 
mirror which alienates it in an image or an intention of it.  The Real is not an object or 
representation and consequently auto-representation’ (Laruelle 2013, 137).  Confronted with such 
an insight – that philosophy ‘does not reach the Real’ (Laruelle 2013, 5) – the challenge laid down 
by Laruelle to philosophy will be wholly singular: ‘to postulate – through a thought adequate to the 
Real – a type of experience or of the Real that escapes auto-positioning’ [sic] (Laruelle 2013, 4-5).  
To ‘refuse’ the ‘principal pretension’ of philosophy is not to abandon philosophy altogether, but it 
is to introduce the ‘democracy of thought’ into philosophy.  However, to enact such a refusal, I 
would suggest – to ‘democratise’ philosophy – requires nothing more nor less than the suspension 
of philosophy as an apparatus. 
It is precisely here that the ‘radical’ nature of Laruelle’s thought converges with the radical 
implications of performance philosophy and its challenge.  So how might all of this help us to 
elucidate the question of what performance philosophy is itself?  And, relatedly, of what its ‘field’ 
is?  In the first place, we can say that this question (which is the question of the performance of 
performance philosophy) is to be understood in strictly non-philosophical terms – that is to say, it 
begins with the radical gesture of accepting philosophy’s fundamental contingency although not 
its necessity as per its own decisional apparatus (that philosophy has no priority over other forms 
of thought and that it does not speak for the Real as a whole).  Let us, in fact, begin by drawing an 
equivalence here by saying that if ‘non-philosophy’ or non-standard philosophy, as Laruelle 
sometimes calls it, is not itself a philosophy so much as it is the practice of re-orientating 
philosophy to this ‘non-philosophical’ margin in a non-appropriative way, then might not 
performance philosophy be the procedure of introducing democracy into ‘theories’ of performance 
in order to dissolve their own transcendental status?  It is in relation to this non-appropriating 
gesture vis-à-vis performance that we can begin to understand how performance philosophy itself 
emerges – or might be construed – through its alignment with what Laruelle designates as ‘non-
standard’ philosophy, which is to say, with that ‘new democratic order of thought’ that refuses 
philosophy’s game of domination and mastery (Laruelle 2013, 13).  Laruelle writes: 
If philosophy has only been and only ever will be an opinion and a poorly thought 
out passion, then the question is of passing from its state of war and of competition, 
a state of exploitation of thought and as such of man, to its civil state, which we 
want to call human and democratic (Laruelle 2013, 13). 
And yet it is not simply a matter of drawing an equivalence here by saying that just as non-standard 
philosophy dismantles philosophy’s dispositif, through the organon of non-philosophy, so 
performance philosophy dismantles the dispositifs of the philosophies of performance (or theatre).  
Were that the case we would once again surely miss the radical potency promised by the 
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proposition of performance philosophy – that ‘performance thinks’ – that it too enacts a democracy 
of thought.  It is for this reason that performance philosophy both is and is not the same thing as 
performance as philosophy.  For what it also acknowledges is that performance is itself a thought 
of the Real – understanding the ‘of’ here grammatically as indicating the genitive case: performance 
as ‘possession’ by the Real – as a part of the Real; and as being overdetermined by it.   
It is for this reason that I would say, first and foremost, performance philosophy should in fact be 
thought less as designating a field so much as asserting a hypothesis – a hypothesis that returns 
us (‘in the last instance’ as Laruelle might say) to performance.  Specifically, it is the hypothesis that 
we must hold to such that thinking alongside, through and with performance might begin on the 
basis of an equality of thought rather than as a determining thought.  This is the radical and non-
trivial hypothesis contained in the statement ‘performance thinks’.  This does not mean that when 
performance and theatre ‘thinks’ it must think ‘philosophically.’  Such a generalised demand would 
hardly lead to a more capacious understanding of performance philosophy; nor, conversely, 
should such a hypothesis ever be simply reduced to a verifiable or non-verifiable fact of the matter 
– as though it were something simply to be proven or disproven.  As a hypothesis, performance 
philosophy must be tested in ‘the field’ – certainly – as per the singularity of the individual case.  
Still, the hypothesis of performance philosophy remains irreducible to the particular.  Only as such 
might we maintain it in its radicality as instituting the organon of an equalising thought that is able 
to hold open the field of performance philosophy.  The reason for this might be seen once we 
understand that it is the hypothesis of a generic suspension of the constitutive role of 
conceptualising thought with respect to the determination of its object.  This is what I think is 
indicated in the challenge encapsulated in the proclamation (not that performance thinks but that 
it thinks (non)philosophically), which challenges us to act on the basis of the presupposition of the 
equality of thought and thinkers.  As such it is the hypothesis of the revolt of thought: a revolt that 
brings thinking back from its transcendental and normative pretensions, and its flirtation with 
power, to its properly democratic dimension, as the thought of the one and the ‘anyone’.  In this 
sense, performance philosophy could well be conceived as building on the foundations – utopian 
as they may well appear – laid out by Laruelle for a non-standard philosophical project, which calls 
for a radical egalitarian approach to thinking by repealing the authority contained in the 
philosophical dispositif.  The effect of such an ‘utopian’ approach would be as startling to the field 
of performance as it already is to the epistemological field of philosophy itself, where it has already 
begun a ‘necessary mutation [that] change[s] the very concept of thought, in its relations to 
philosophy and to other forms of knowledge… an inversion that concerns a reversal of old 
hierarchies, but through a formulation of a new type of primacy without relationships of 
domination; without relations in general’ (Laruelle 2012, 232). 
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1 See Martin Puchner’s comment in the unpublished talk, ‘Theatre and Philosophy: Please Mind the Gap’: ‘How can 
an art form with a weak and self-doubting intellectual tradition attached to it be brought into a level playing field 
with the Dowager Queen of the university?’ (cited in Cull 2014, 21). 
2 This question provided the impetus behind this paper, and was posed by Broderick Chow at a research seminar 
held at Brunel University on 19th November, 2014. 
3 It should be said, although I do not have the space to develop this idea here that in fact Badiou’s axiom ‘theatre 
thinks’ is by no means the same as Cull’s axiom ‘performance thinks’ – and not least because Badiou reinstates 
the imperial dimension of philosophical thought in requiring that each event of theatre think its own idea, that is, 
the ‘idea of theatre’ itself of which it remains an incomplete attempt. 
4 Thus surreptitiously does hierarchy reassert itself at the very moment Deleuze equalises ‘thought’! 
5 ‘Under whatever form we take it, transcendence is the heart of Decision and what conditions it as auto-position, 
and the mixture of auto-position is existence under which transcendence gives itself as Decision’s essence’ 
(Laruelle 2013, 245). 
6 It is radically contingent because philosophical decision is always an operation of thought that is grounded in an 
attempted ‘self-grounding’ (see Anthony Paul Smith’s discussion on this point in Smith 2012, 22-23). 
Notes 
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